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Abstract
The early start of the process of bank restructuring and  investment)-or by the management style adopted after
privatization  in Hungary  provides a longer and richer  the acquisition.  The authors supplement previous results
amount of evidence than that available  for any other  on the effects of foreign  bank ownership  in three ways.
transition economy.  Majnoni,  Shankar, and Varhegyi  First, they explicitly consider  the time span required for
analyze the dynamics of bank restructuring  in Hungary  the change of ownership  to affect bank performance.
with a focus on the role played by foreign  ownership.  Second, the authors explore how important the chosen
They explore the performance  over time of foreign-  acquisition strategy  is for the  success of an acquisition.
owned Hungarian  banks and study the extent to which  And third, they study how relevant the adopted
efficiency gains are affected  by the chosen acquisition  management style is to this end, as proxied by the degree
strategy-strategic acquisition  in contrast with  of reliance on foreign management.
investment in a newly  established bank (greenfield
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comments.I1.  Introduction.
A growing body of empirical  evidence has shown the positive impact that foreign
ownership has on banks'  perfornance  in developing and in transition economies.
Seldom,  though has the analysis focused  on the dynamics of bank performance  following
the change  in ownership. How long does it take for the new management to be able to
affect the different parameters of bank performance?  and which parameters are foreign
owners most likely to affect?  And finally are these effects dependent from the mode of
entry? These are questions that need to be answered in order to better understand the
chain of events through which foreign ownership eventually  affects bank efficiency of the
host country.  Although a relatively large amount of empirical evidence  has been
analyzed for mature economies much less is known about foreign ownership  in emerging
countries'.
There are several reasons for which there is scant empirical evidence  on the
channels through which foreign ownership affects banks performance.  Uneven data
quality,  or lack of comparable data over sufficiently long sample periods have been an
obstacle to detailed empirical tests based on large cross countries datasets.  On the other
hand, analyses focused on individual  country experiences  cannot easily  disentangle the
effects of foreign ownership on bank efficiency  from those of other concurrent  financial
reforms. This paper intends to contribute to a better understanding of the effects of
foreign ownership on individual banks'  performance by looking closely at the experience
of one country - Hungary - that presents particularly desirable features  from the
perspective of a case study.  Hungary had, in fact,  an early start in the transition process
toward a market economy and was one among the first countries to allow foreign
ownership of its banks.  As a result, Hungary  appears to be the only transition economy
for which an econometric  analysis could be based on a sufficiently long string of good
quality data while at the same time keeping to a minimum the disturbance  effects of
simultaneous major banking reforms.
2The first part of this paper (sections 2 to 4) provides an overview of the main
features of the changes in bank corporate governance  in Hungary over the 1  990s.  It sets
out the main descriptive evidence and provides the motivation and a guide to the testing
strategy to be followed in the second part of the paper.
More specifically,  we shall discuss the environment in which bank reforms took
place and their timing (section 2), the process of foreign banks entry in Hungary (section
3) and the performance  records of different groups of foreign  owned banks (section 4). In
particular,  we shall explore the effects associated with different forms of foreign presence
(diffuse or strategic,  related to a "green-field"  investment or to the acquisition of a
preexisting concern) and with different productive choices. (concentrated on niche
markets or on wider business segments).
The second part (Sections 5 and 6) verifies whether the descriptive evidence and
the conjectures discussed in the previous  sections possess indeed  a statistical  significance
and  can withstand econometric tests. Over the sample of 26 commercial  banks active in
the period  1994-2000 we test whether foreign ownership has significantly affected cost
efficiency (as measured by operating costs and by number of employees  over assets),
profit efficiency (as measure by pretax profits over assets and by lending spreads) or bank
development  (as measured by loan growth) and over what time intervals.  In addition, we
tests how efficiency gains have been affected by the chosen acquisition strategy -
strategic acquisition versus green-field investment  - or by the adopted management  style
- majority of foreigners  in the board of directors or appointment  of a foreign CEO.  After
controlling for macroeconomic  developments and for bank specific features we find that
all these aspects have played a statistically significant role in affecting the success or
failure of different acquisition strategies in the Hungarian  market.  While our results are
specific to the Hungarian case, the detailed characterization  of the efficiency  gains
associated with the presence of foreign ownership may not be unique to the Hungarian
experience and may be of more general interest.
See for a comprehensive  survey of recent literature on foreign bank ownership in  emerging economies
Clarke et al. (2003).
3Overall, this paper supplements  previous results on the effects of foreign bank
ownership in three ways. First, it explicitly  considers the time span required  for changes
of ownership to affect the acquired banks'  performance.  Second it examines the impact of
the chosen acquisition strategy on different measures of bank efficiency,  and, third, it
seeks to answer to the question of whether the reliance on foreign or domestic
management  has differential  impact on bank efficiency.
2.  Development  and Reform of the Hungarian Banking Sector.
The reforms launched  in the 1960s and  1980s and the resulting move towards a
more open economy,  shaped the development  and the ownership  structure of the
Hungarian banking system.  Trade, largely  fostered through close economic ties with
Western Europe, led to higher foreign direct investment in the 1970s, and to the setting
up by foreign companies (e.g.  General Electric,  Siemens,  Shell)  of numerous joint
ventures.  This brought into focus the need for effective provision of financial  services.  In
1979 National Bank of Hungary (NBH), the Hungarian central bank founded CIB with
the participation of five international  commercial  banks. This was followed by Citibank
Budapest,  with Citibank Overseas  holding 80 per cent, and Unicbank,  in which IFC, DG
Bank and Raiffeisen had a 15  percent  stake each.
The other main trend in the modernization of Hungarian banking was the
emergence  of the two-tier system, which went together with the birth of new institutions.
Hungary was the first CEE country that modernized its financial sector by creating a two-
tier banking  system, more adapted to the market environment2. Parallel with this process
small specialized  financial institutions were developed from funds that had been pooled
from different corporate or fiscal moneys in the early 1980s  and operated as quasi banks.
These specialized banks became the seeds of some of the future small and medium size
2  The new system, set up on January 1 1987, led to the spin-off of the Hungarian Credit Bank (MHM),  the
Commercial and Credit Bank (K&H),  and the Budapest Bank (BB) from the NBH, removing from the
latter all commercial bank functions and leaving to the NBH only central bank functions.  The three spin-
offs became the main actors in the new system together with the historical National  Savings Bank (OTP),
the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank (MKB) and the General Banking & Trust (AEB).  Postabank was
established by government initiative in  1988.
4banks, like Inter-Eur6pa  Bank (latter bought by San Paolo di Torino), General Bank for
Venture Financing  (latter bought by WestLB),  Agrobank and Mez6bank (latter bought by
Erste).
At the turn of the 1  990s the partial privatization of some banks brought additional
foreign capital into the banking sector: the state sold 20 per cent of the Inter-Eur6pa Bank
to San Paolo di Torino, 50 per cent of AEB to U.S. financial investors,  and 20 per cent of
the Postabank to three Austrian financial  institutions.  All three transactions involved
capital increases  in the banks.
The joint banks established prior to  1990 and the partially privatized  institutions
posed an ever larger challenge to the Hungarian banks, thereby contributing to an
increase in the general  standards of banking services. The competition became
particularly  fierce upon the liberalization of banking activities.  The liberalization of retail
operations took place in 1989 together with a gradual liberalization of trade-related
foreign operations.  Banks, which had served  only corporate clients, were allowed to
perform retail operations, whereas retail banks began to offer the full range of
commercial  banking services.
The Act on Credit Institutions allowed banks to conduct investment banking
activities - that the 1990 Act on Securities  restricted to authorized  security dealers only -
through wholly-owned  subsidiaries.  So notwithstanding an organizational  separation,
commercial banks could engage  in investment banking.  This institutional  segregation was
gradually abolished after  1997: commercial  banks were first licensed for government
securities transactions,  and then for the full range of investment banking in 1999.
The increase in the number of market players, the appearance of foreign owners
and the liberalization of banking enhanced  competition,  but problem loans inherited  from
the past increased dramatically  due to the financial problems faced by enterprises during
the accelerated  reforms process started  in the early  1990s.  The Bankruptcy Act
introduced in 1992 worsened the situation. By 1992, the fast growth of bad loans became
one of the most critical obstacles to the operation of the Hungarian banking system.  The
fire fighting "loan consolidation program"  did not bring about the desired long term
5improvement  in the positions of either the banks or their debtors.  Therefore, further
"bank and the debtor consolidation  programs" were implemented in 1993  and  19943.
The "loan consolidation program"  (which intluded the acquisition by the
government of bad debts of banks) led to considerable  short term improvement in the
position of the banking system (Balassa,  1996). Capital adequacy ratios were increased.
However, the benefits of loan consolidation did not last long. The portfolios retained by
the banks continued to deteriorate because of more rigorous criteria of classification and
poor debtor positions.  Without addressing ownership and management problems the key
issues of banks'  under-capitalization  could not be solved.
In spite of portfolio cleaning, the total problem loan portfolio  in the banking
system kept increasing and by the end of 1993  it reached  29 per cent of the outstanding
loans of banks,  16 per cent of total banking assets and 12 per cent of GDP. Due to the
related provisioning requirements,  many state owned banks became technically  insolvent.
The government  led re-capitalization  effort brought government  share of bank equity
over 75% in 7 of the 8 concerned banks.
The new bank consolidation agreements  defined at the end of 1993  imposed more
stringent performance  requirements on bank managers.  Each bank had to develop a
strategy to improve operating costs, rationalize organization and loan classification
procedures,  and credit rating systems.  Subject to the achievement of these objectives,  a
new re-capitalization  was completed  by the end of 1994. The program had mixed
success. Problem loans (substandard,  doubtful or bad loans) gradually were reduced both
in absolute terms and as a share of total assets (Table  1), although, total loans of these
banks decreased  at an even higher rate due to more rigorous lending criteria.
Consequently the level of commercial  and  industrial loans of banks involved  in
consolidation programs decreased in 1995,  notwithstanding an inflation rate close to
3See Abel and Bonin,  1994, Virhegyi, 2001.
620%. The share of commercial  and industrial  loans over total bank assets decreased from
22% to 19% during the consolidation period.
The debate on the reform of public property did not touch the banking sector until
1989, when the issue of bank privatization was raised by the interest shown by some
West European banks to acquire participations in the two largest  commercial  banks,
Hungarian Credit Bank (MHB) and Commercial  and Credit Bank (K&H).  The
"modernization"  of the banking sector was still perceived by the government  as a
responsibility of public policy.
Privatization was initially launched through capital  increases.  By the end of year
1990, the state's direct stake in the banking sector had fallen to 39 percent also as a
consequence of the high proportion of new banks founded  privately.  The partial
privatization of banks of lower importance and the increase of the minority foreign  shares
continued  in the nineties.  The privatization  process, though, suffered  a setback as a result
of heavy state interventions that brought back government's direct presence in the
banking system above sixty percent,  when measured as a proportion of total assets and up
to 86 per cent as a proportion of equity capital (Table 2).
The first significant bank privatization took place with the partial  sale of
Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank  (HFTB)in the summer of 1994. Joint private and public
ownership was thought to be  sufficient to ensure bank's profit oriented policies, balanced
proprietary structure and the amount of capital resources necessary for growth.  The
winning bid was made by the pair EBRD (financial investor with a share of 16,68%) and
Bayerische Landesbank (strategic  investor with a 25,01%  share), whose stake increased
two years  later when the state sold its 25 percent  share.  The same scheme characterized
the sale of Budapest Bank in 1995 to GE Capital and the EBRD. During  1996-97 MHB,
K&H and other commercial  banks were sold to strategic foreign investors, according to
the basic scheme of the Hungarian bank privatization that privileged the pursue of a
strategic foreign presence (Varhegyi,.2001).
A second  scheme  has been followed by the Hungarian authorities with the partial
sale in the summer of 1995 of the largest retail bank, National  Savings  and Commercial
7Bank (OTP). By forbidding the presence of strategic investors, by preserving a 25 percent
stake in public hands and by promoting a prevalent  domestic ownership, the Govemment
wished to create a diversified  proprietary  structure, dominated by institutional  investors.
Overall, the privatization of the Hungarian  banking system was practically
completed by the end of 1997. By that time state ownership  had dropped to 21 per cent of
bank capital while the foreign  stake had increased  to over 60%. At the end of 2000 state
ownership had dropped to  19% while the foreign stake had increased to over 66% (Table
2). If we exclude Postabank that went through a severe crisis and required new public
funds in 1998 and two small banks whose privatization failed,  only banks with specific
public functions have remained  in public hands (Eximbank, Hungarian Development
Bank, Land Credit and Mortgage Bank).
3.  Foreign banks ownership  in Hungary
The whole process of bank restructuring and reforms relied on and, to a large
extent,  has been characterized  by the important role that the Hungarian authorities  invited
foreign banks to play and that was actively pursued though a liberal entry policy and a
deliberate emphasis on the presence of strategic investors in bank privatizations.  The Act
on Financial Institutions,  enacted at the end of 1991, to a large extent was in conformity
with European standards (Varhegyi,  1996b). The legislation concerning bank
establishment had always been very liberal and the low threshold of market entry
favored the operation of several newly founded foreign banks in Hungary. Licenses were
granted automatically  provided that applicant met the requirements  of prudence;
government approval was required only for acquisitions  in excess of 10 percent of the
controls firms.  Thanks to the liberal licensing policy, the number of banks doubled  in
1987-1995  and the overwhelming  majority of the new banks were at least partly owned
by foreigners. No barriers were raised to foreign strategic investors in the privatization
deals.  The selection in the invitational tender bids was based on two criteria:  purchase
price and the promised capital increase.
The Second Banking Act Amendment in late  1997, by allowing branch
establishment to foreign financial institutions, completed Hungary's compliance with the
8obligations of OECD membership,  and accelerated  accession to the European Union.  The
legislators,  however,  made provisional regulations intended to strengthen the capital base
of bank operating in the country,  by requesting foreign bank branches to comply with
capital requirements  similar to those of bank subsidiaries.
As a result of a liberal entry policy the establishment of foreign and joint banks
began to escalate  after  1990.  Up to the launch of the Government's privatization program
in 1994, foreign and joint banks had been growing  mainly through green-field investment
and new market entries. ABN AMRO,  Commerzbank,  Creditanstalt,  Credit Lyonnais,
Hypobank,  ING, Nomura,  and Volksbank appeared  in the early  1990s. At the end of 1994
these eight wholly foreign banks accounted for  10 per cent of the capital in the Hungarian
banking sector,  and foreigners had another 6 per cent share in the joint banks with a
foreign majority.  Between 1987 and  1994 the number of banks more than doubled,
passing from 21 to 44, with a majority of them owned by foreign investors.  (see Table 3).
By  1997 the number of banks operating with majority foreign ownership  had grown to 30
with over 50 per cent of total assets. By the end of the year 2000 foreign controlled banks
accounted for over two thirds of the total assets (Table 4).
3.1.  Foreign Investors Entry Strategies.
The great majority of the foreign shareholders  in Hungarian banking are strategic
investors. In some cases, multilateral finance organizations (EBRD, IFC) temporarily
held minority stakes in the privatized banks. The different motivations with which
foreign banks entered the Hungarian market was reflected in diverse business  strategies.
A key motive was to serve internationally  active corporate clients that had acquired  an
interest in Hungary.  Owing to the early opening up of the Hungarian economy,  the
number of foreign and multinational  firms began to soar in the late 1980s (see Farkas,
1999).  Several West European banks founded  subsidiaries  here (and in other East
European countries)  so that they could provide high-quality services to these companies
and their foreign employees  on the spot (for instance, Germany's  Commerzbank or
Credit Lyonnais of  France).
9Another important factor of market entry was represented by the growth
opportunities that Hungary as a host country, presented or appeared  to present. The
growth opportunities of less developed East European markets meant excellent
opportunities to generate higher profits than in mature home markets. This was the
strategy pursued by the Austrian banks, which in view of past historical and cultural
relations,  had an in depth knowledge of the Hungarian market.  CA and Raiffeisen  earned
most of their profits in the eastern markets in the 1990s. The key element in this strategy
was the acquisition of low-risk customers and large-volume transactions (multinationals,
Hungarian  monopolies  such as the oil or the telecommunications  company), which
helped to push down costs (Abel  and Szekely,  1994). In other cases the intention was
simply to secure presence,  in view of possible future expansion in Hungary or in other
.4 neighboring transition economies4.
Foreign investors strategies were also conditioned by governments policies. Until
1994, the critical year of the Government's privatization  strategy,  purchase of existing
banks was limited only to minority shareholders (see Inter-Eur6pa Bank, Postabank).
Banks were put on sale for strategic  investors only after the portfolio cleaning that began
in 1994.  All foreign banks participating  in the privatization sought majority (or even
exclusive)  stakes, reflecting their role of strategic  investors.  This is confirmed by the fact
that the new owners effected substantial capital increases,  and made large investments in
information technology  and network development (Varhegyi,  1999). As for the
investment strategy between the 1980s and  1990s 25 foreign owners opted for a green-
field investment and  11  preferred to purchase existing banks. Two-thirds of the market
entries had taken place before  1995  (Table 5).
The strategy of entering the Hungarian banking market may also  have been
affected by the period of entry, with early entrants choosing green-field investment in
light of more favorable opportunities to conquer important market shares.  In addition to
4This might explain the opening of representation offices,  or Nomura's bank, which closed down after a
few years.  This "wait-and-see"  approach is reflected in the operation of the Deutsche Bank, which has kept
a relatively low profile so far.
10the considerable  success in expanding their positions on the market as a whole (Table 6),
many green-field  institutions turned out to be very successful in specific  market
segments:  notably corporate and investment banking.
Market  saturation, lower than expected  growth, and increased competition  led to
a decline in the number of green-field investments after 1995. In addition,  bank strategies
in Hungary started reflecting the large-scale M&A activity in developed countries
banking systems. Foreign banks entering the market in the second half of the 1990s
sought,  in the first place, to fill in market niches:  as in the case of 'car banks',  credit
institutions  specializing  in consumer loans and home loans were established.
3.2  Selection of management  styles.
Under Hungarian company law, the board of directors  is responsible for medium-
term strategy, while the supervisory board serves to control the operation on behalf of the
shareholders.  The management,  under the leadership of the chief executive office,  who
also sits on the board, is responsible for the day-to-day operation (see Bonin and al.,
1998). The Hungarian banking legislation  stipulates that at least two of the directors shall
be Hungarian citizens, and at least two shall be employed  by the bank.  Some of the
foreign strategic investors employed Hungarian nationals  as CEO or as chairman of the
board,  while others preferred  to second experts from the parent bank to hold the top
positions in the Hungarian subsidiaries.
The choice between the two strategies often did correlate with the nationality of
the owners:  Austrians,  Germans and Italians, who are more familiar with the Hungarian
situation, entrusted  local managers with management  more often than others (e.g.
Americans  or Asians).  The former often relied on the stock of bankers who had gained
relatively up-to-date  knowledge in the international  division of NBH,  the Hungarian
Foreign Trade Bank, or the foreign subsidiaries or representations  of NBH in the  1980s
(see Varhegyi,  1996a).4.  The performance of foreign banks in Hungary.
Foreign-owned banks achieved varying degrees of success  in Hungary. Generally,
banks established as green-field  investment and controlled by strategic  owners performed
better than the privatized banks, including those controlled by strategic investors . This
indicates that a crucial  factor affecting bank performance  lies in the nature of inherited
problems  as reflected in different entry procedures.
At the same time, not all green-field investments produced the expected  results. In quite a
number of cases even several years of operation did not lead to the right measure of
profitability.  This has been the case for banks which could not earn a sufficient market
share,  and did not operate as a specialized financial institution (e.g. car finance) or in a
narrow market segment (consumer lending).
It is easier to understand the reasons of success and failure if banks are classified
according to performance and to owner strategy.  Of the 23 banks that have been under
foreign control for at least five years,  10 can be classified as well-performing
organizations.  The majority of them were created as green-field  investment.  Only three
banks, among those privatized through a foreign acquisition, have shown improvements
in terms of market share and efficiency.  Well-performing banks can be split into four
groups according to the owners'  investment and market strategy:
*  Green-field  investments,  successfully  expanding on a wide market (CIB, Raiffeisen,
BA-CA, Citibank)
*  Green-field  investments that have grown into successful  niche banks (Porsche and
Daewoo), and BNP, which operates successfully on a rather small market
*  Successful banks privatized for strategic investors (HFTB, AEB)
*  The successful large bank OTP, held by foreign portfolio investors as minority
shareholders.
Poorly  performing  banks can instead be split into two groups, based on their entry and
governance  features:
12* Green-field investments that have achieved  a moderate performance (ING,
Commerzbank,  HypoVereinsbank,  Volksbank,  IC)
* Banks sold to strategic investors which show a moderate or poor performance  (ABN
Amro, K&H, Budapest Bank,  Takarekbank,  Erste, Hanwha, IEB, WestLB)
Table 7 summarizes the average performance of the individual groups in 1996-
2000 according to certain profitability indicators5. In terms of profitability and cost-
effectiveness the green-field banks showed a better combined  performance than
privatized institutions, notwithstanding the higher interest margins earned by the latter.
The main reasons for the poorer results of the privatized banks are higher operating costs,
and more importantly,  the higher provisioning costs.  The latter explains why differences
in total profitability ratios,  as measured by ROA and ROE, are much larger than those
associated with operating income and costs.
The parent banks of the majority of the green-field banks are capital-rich
institutions with strong positions and good performance internationally  (e.g. Citibank,
ING, Commerzbank).  A common feature of the green-field banks that have achieved an
outstanding performance and a good market position is a long-standing  presence on the
Hungarian  market: three out of four were active in Hungary since the  1980s,  and also the
fourth also has been operating for more than a decade.
Early market entry enabled these banks to build up a core clientele,  particularly of
large corporations,  in a period when competition was much weaker (Claessens  and al.,
2000, Kiraly and al.,  2000). Later,  in the second half of the 1990s, when expansion
became impossible in the corporate  market segment, banks reoriented their focus towards
retail banking, though for high-income customers (e.g. private banking). Only Citibank
pursued a different market/product  strategy by offering "quality"  retail services in
Budapest since the early  1990s, relying on the growing expatriate population.
5  Two of the five years, notably 1998 and 1999, were affected adversely by the Russian financial crisis,
which hit many banks, not so much because of loans advanced  to Russian banks and companies, rather
because of failures among Hungarian finns that export to Russia. The banks also suffered huge losses in
securities transactions.
13Successful green-field banks have  shared similar corporate governance features.
In three of the four successful ones,  foreign owners made good use of the expertise of
local managers,  and laid emphasis on local demands and opportunities,  as opposed to a
strong reliance  on the parent company management and organizational  patterns.
The poorer than average  performers,  among privatized banks,  represent a rather
heterogeneous  group. Within this group,  OTP, with a scattered ownership,  has been the
best performer.  Only 35  to 47 per cent of OTP's shares have been held by international
portfolio investors, with the remaining part in the hands of Hungarian financial investors.
Essentially controlled by the management,  OTP has been continuously improving  since
the privatization,  which may be explained by the personal interest of the managers  and
the listing of OTP shares at the Budapest Stock Exchange.  The lack of a strategic investor
is partly offset by the fact that the international  owners (mainly US pension funds) are
represented by a trustee at the company's general  meetings.  At the same time,  OTP's
profitability  largely follows from its leading position on the retail market (40 per cent of
household deposits),  a legacy of its former monopoly.  This is reflected  in a large interest
margin that provides the main source of gross earnings.
Among the ten banks sold to strategic investors only two were able to achieve
good results: HFTB in the hands of the Bayerische  Landesbank,  and AEkB,  purchased by
Russia's Gazprom.  The key to HFTB's success appears to be the choice of the German
owner to employ qualified Hungarian bankers to shape the bank's strategy and to manage
the organization,  while the bulk of AEB's earnings was generated on the Russian inter-
bank  market.
The poor performance  of the majority of privatized banks is a consequence of the
bad legacy represented  by high operating costs and above-average  reserves, which are
related to inefficient branch network, underdeveloped  IT, and low-quality clientele.
Several internationally  reputed owners tried to replicate without success strategies
already  pursued in more developed countries.
Higher profitability,  when achieved,  has come from the joint effect of higher
interest margins and  lower operating costs and smaller provisioning  costs.  In this respect;
14the Hungarian  experience seems to be at odds with the general  evidence that on average
foreign banks are able to reduce the size of the intermediation  margins.  Among privatized
banks only green-field  ones were, in fact,  able to achieve significantly lower interest
margins  (see Table 7).
5.  The estimation procedure and the data.
Previous  sections  have  outlined  several  general  observable  features  associated
with bank privatization  and the  entry of foreign  banks in Hungary.  We try now to verify
econometrically  whether  the relationship between  domestic  or foreign ownership  and the
indicators  of banks'  efficiency and  activity,  is statistically robust  and does not reflect the
effect of other macro or micro level variables.  We estimate the following model:
EAI,t  = a +  , 1 MCV,  + f 2BCV,  + / 3DFO,, + /34FMVS,  + / 5FIT, + e,
We  use  as  dependent  variables  a  set  of five Efficiency  and  Activity  Indicators
(EAI)  in  order to  catch  different  aspects  of cost  efficiency,  of profit  efficiency  and  of
lending activity.  The  five dependent  variables  are  given by Operating  cost/Total  assets,
Staff/Total  assets, Return on assets,  Average lending  spreads,  and Loan growth.  The set
of explanatory  variables,  similar  for  all the different  dependent  variables,  is  given  by  a
selection of Macro  level Control  Variables (MCV), a set of Bank level  Control VariabJes
(BCV)  and  by  three  sets  of  variables  descriptive  of  different  features  of  foreign
ownership.  In  this  latter  group  we  have  included  variables  related  to  the  Duration  of
Foreign  Ownership  (DFO), of Foreign Management  Style  (FMS),  and of Foreign  initial
Investment Type (FIT).
The Macro  Control Variables  (MCV), are represented by the logarithm of real per
capita GDP  and  by the  rate  inflation,  as  measured  by the  GDP  deflator.  Among  Bank
Control  Variables  (BCV)  we  have  included  a  size  variable,  given  by the  logarithm  of
total  assets,  the  leverage  ratio,  given  by  the  ratio  of equity  over  total  assets,  and  a
profitability indicator, the net interest income ratio over total assets.
The  three  sets  of variables  describing  foreign  ownership  specific  features  are
composed as follows.  Thejfirst set, intends to catch the effects of the Duration of Foreign
15Ownership  (DFO) and is given by four different  dummies (FORCONT)  that take value  1
when foreign control  has lasted for at least n years (with n going from  1 to 4 years)  and
zero  elsewhere;  we  also  considered  .a modulated  dummy  equal to the  logarithm of the
number  of years  elapsed  since the  beginning  of foreign  ownership.  Foreign  control  is
defined  as  an ownership  share  equal to or larger than 50  per cent of outstanding  equity.
The  second set  of variables,  meant  to  measure  the  role  of Foreign  Management  Style
(FMS),  refers  to  the  presence  of foreign  individuals  in  the  management  and  in  the
executive board.  It includes  a dummy variable (FORBOD) that takes value one when the
majority of the members  of the Board  of directors  is  foreign and zero  elsewhere  and  a
second  dummy variable (FORCEO) that takes value one when the CEO is foreigner.  The
third  set  of  variables,  related  the  Foreign  Investment  Type  (FIT),  distinguishes
investments  in  newly  established  banks  (greenfield  investments)  from  purchases  of
control  shares  in existing  institutions  (M&A investments).  Two dummy  variables  have
been  defined  that  take  value  one  when  the  investment  is  a  greenfield  or  a  M&A
investment and zero elsewhere.
We  use  both  fixed  effects  and  random  effects  regressions  to  allow  for  bank
specific  effects,  according  to the results of the Hausman  test.  The estimation  results are
reported  in  Tables  9-13.  The  test  for  the  relevance  of the  different  types  of initial
investment is based,  instead, on a stacked OLS regression.  This approach  was required to
avoid the problems generated  by the collinearity  of the FIT dummy  variables with bank
specific dummies.  The estimation results are reported in Table  14.
The  sample  period  starts  in  1995,  the  year  following  the  definition  of the
privatization  strategy,  and  includes the following  six years until  the year 2000.  It covers
26 commercial  banks,  for a total number of observations  that,  according to the different
specifications,  is  between  a  minimum  of 122  and  a  maximum  of  156.  We  note  that
because  of  serious,  and  atypical  restructuring  problems,  the  observation  relative  to
Postabank in  1998 were eliminated  from our sample.
Table  8 provides  some descriptive  statistics  about the variables  in the estimation
sample.  Banks  in  our  sample  were  on  average  adequately  capitalized  with  an  average
leverage  ratio  of  12%  but  some  of them  experienced  capital  shortages.  Net  interest
16income  represented  on average  5%  of total  assets, operating  costs  4%  and  returns  1%.
The average  volume of intermediated  funds per bank employee is equal to 100 million of
Hungarian  Forints and the mean value of the  lending spread (average lending rate minus
average  deposit  rate)  was  equal  to 6  percentage  points.  Three  fourths  of the  available
observations in our sample were referred to foreign owned institutions.
6.  The estimation results.
The  set of regressions  that we have just described  appear to provide a qualified
support to the descriptive  evidence  discussed  in the first part of the paper.  Although  it is
evident that our results should  not be generalized to countries with different financial  and
regulatory  structures,  they  detect  behaviors  often  obscured  by  the  higher  noise  that
plagues data of multi-country  panels.
The first two  sets of regressions  try to detect the effect of foreign  ownership  on
cost efficiency.  Table 9 reports the results of the effects on operating costs and Table  10
the impact  on labor costs,  as proxied  by the number of banks'  staff. Table  9 shows that,
while operating costs appear to increase in the first two years following the acquisition by
a foreign entity and  decrease thereafter,  such evidence  is not statistically  significant.  The
only significant foreign ownership variables are those,  describing the foreign presence  in
the ruling bodies,  showing  that local  management of foreign  banks  is most  effective  in
reducing  costs.  These  results  are  usefully  complemented  by  those  concerning  the
dynamics of labor costs presented in Table  10, that shows a very significant reduction of
labor  costs (proxied  by the number of bank staff per value of intermediated  funds) in the
first three years after the acquisition  of control.  Interestingly  the reduction of labor costs
is clearly related to the presence of a foreign owner and does not appear to be affected by
the  management  style  as  described  by  the presence  of domestic  national  in the banks'
governing  bodies. In fact, negative  and  strongly significant  effects are present both in the
case where  a  domestic  and a  foreign  CEO  manages  the foreign owned  institution.  The
summary  evidence  that  can  be  drawn  from  these  results  is  that  foreign  ownership  is
characterized  by an immediate  rationalization  of labor  costs that tends to be achieved  in
the  first  three  years.  The  reduction  in  the  numbers  of employees,  though,  is generally
offset by  either higher wages or higher expenditures in new infrastructures,  reducing the
17overall effects  of a change  of ownership - from domestic to foreign - on operating costs.
In  addition,  the  costs  of  new  infrastructures  or  more  qualified  workforce  increases
together with the presence  of foreign elements  in the  governing  bodies,  while it is more
effectively kept under control by domestic CEOs.
Do operating  costs behave  differently  when the acquisition  has been the result of
the acquisition  of a  previously  existing  institution  or  of a  greenfield  investment?  The
answer,  largely  consistent  wit-h  the  descriptive  evidence,  is that  greenfield  investments
are  clearly  associated  with  lower  operating  and  labor  costs  than M&A  operations,  as
shown  by the negative  and  significant  coefficient  of the  greenfield  variable  both in the
operating costs regression and in the bank staff regression  (Table  14, columns  1 and 2).
Let  us  now  move to the  analysis  of the  effects  of foreign  ownership  on  profit
efficiency.  The expected  sign of foreign ownership  on profits,  here proxied by the return
on  assets  (ROA),  is  not  obvious  a priori. On  one  side  a  more  efficient  production
function and  a better ability to diversify risks characterizes  large foreign owners  leading
to  a  possible  increase  of profits,  on the  other  the greater  competition  provided  by  the
foreign  presence  may  well  reduce  the  position  rents  previously  enjoyed  by  local
institutions,  pushing  profits  down.  In addition,  multinational  entities may  largely  affect
the results of foreign  controlled  subsidiaries through  a policy of transfer  prices intended
to improve the risk-return  profile  at a global  level6. For these different  reasons empirical
evidence  is  particularly  important.  We  analyze  profitability  along  two  dimensions,
exploring  the effects  of foreign ownership on both total profitability and the profitability
associated with the lending activity,  as measured  by the average  level of lending spreads.
The  results relative  to the  ROA regressions  are reported  in Table  11  and show
that  profitability  unambiguously  increases  with  a  positive  progression  in the  first  four
years  after a foreign acquisition.  It also remains  consistently positive in a longer horizon,
as shown by the positive coefficient  of the variable  "number of years of foreign control".
The coefficients  associated  with domestic  and foreign management  suggest that a higher
6 Foreign banks enjoyed tax benefits in the first half of 1990s,  and later an income tax rate of 18 per cent
that might have provided an incentive to transfer part of their home profit to Hungaxy (e.g.  by providing
cheap funds to their Hungarian subsidiaries).
18profitability  is  associated  with  domestic  management,  but  none  of  the  relevant
coefficients  is  statistically  significant  indicating  that  management  styles  are  here  less
relevant  than  on  the  cost  side.  In  other  words,  foreign  banks  appear  to  have  a
considerably  higher  income  generating  capacity  than  domestic  banks,  and  this  allows
them to largely  offset  a  level of operating costs  whose  level,  if not  its  composition,  is
similar to that of local banks.  The substantial  irrelevance of different management  styles,
suggests  also  that the higher revenues  of foreign  institutions  is likely  to be  related  to a
larger panoply  of financial  services more than to a  specific  placing  ability of traditional
products  where  domestic  managers  may  have  a  comparative  advantage.  Finally,  the
profitability  of foreign investments  is unambiguously  and  consistently  higher  for green-
field banks not only with respect to domestic institutions  but also with respect to foreign
banks acquired through M&A operations (Table  14, column 3).
The results  of the regressions of the lending spread (interest income/total  interest
generating assets-  interest expenses/total  interest bearing liabilities)  support our previous
conjectures  concerning the source  of foreign banks  profitability.  In fact,  lending spreads
are  clearly negatively  associated  with  foreign  banks,  and  increasingly  so  as  the  years
from in the  acquisition  elapse.  The  first  significant  coefficient  is that  associated with  a
period  of at  least  four  years  of foreign  control.  The  reduction  of lending  spreads  is
consistent with the general  claim that foreign banks  entry is conducive  to a  reduction of
financial  rents  but  indicates  also  that  the  observed  higher  bank profitability,  discussed
previously,  does  not  come  from  higher  margins  on  the  intermediation  activity  and  is
presumably  due  to  a  larger  panoply  of financial  services  and  a  better  quality  of loan
portfolios.  Even  assuming  an  elasticity  of demand  for  bank  loans  higher  than  one the
effects  of a  lower  mark-up  pricing  on  net  interest  income,  according  to  our evidence,
should  not be felt before four years  from the  foreign acquisition.  All these consideration
can  be  repeated  with  additional  emphasis  for  green-field  banks  that  not  only  show  a
higher  ROA  than  the  rest of the  system  but  also,  once they  are  separated  from  other
foreign banks, show a significantly  smaller spreads than the rest of the system7.
7 Green-field banks have been found to be associated with lower spreads also in a selection of Latin
American countries by Martinez-Peria and Mody (2003). This evidence  may also be related to a
composition effect by which green-field  institutions carry a higher portion of business with corporate
business where both spread and unit cost are lower than in the retail business
19Our  final  test  concerns  the  effects  of foreign  ownership  on  the  level  of bank
lending.  Are foreign banks able to offer competitive conditions and attract  an increasing
volume  of lending?  Our  evidence  supports  the  notion  that  foreign  owned  banks  have
increased their lending but the coefficients, although consistently positive, are significant
in only one case and only  at the  10 per cent level.  More importantly  this is the only case
in our analysis where greenfield banks  do not show a clearly different pattern  from other
foreign owned institutions.  In light of the ongoing debate  about the role plaid by foreign
banks  in lending to the productive  sector, this evidence  may be too weak to support the
notion  that  foreign  banks  though  a  more  effective  screening  and  monitoring  have
succeeded  in  widening  the  access  to  the  credit  market.  At the  same  time,  it  clearly
supports the notion that foreign  banks do not retrench from lending activities,  at least in
countries  such as Hungary where foreign  presence  is pervasive  and includes banks of all
sizes.
7.  Conclusions.
Our conclusions  offer a considerably  detailed  view of the way foreign ownership
affected banks'  performance  in Hungary, possibly sheding light on more general patterns.
A larger  focus  on details,  though,  may come at the cost of generality  and therefore  our
conclusions  should be very  cautiously  extended to different  countries.  Also, the number
of observations  available  in the Hungarian case provide  an upper bound to the efficiency
and robustness of our results.  Still, a country case analysis appears justified, in the case of
Hungary,  by the early start of the liberalization process that makes  it possible to detect  a
sufficiently  extended  sample  period  in  which  bank  decisions  should  not  have  been
affected  by  other  concurrent  events  such  as  major  bank  and  financial  reforms.
Independently  from  statistical  robustness,  caution  in  extrapolating  our  results  is
warranted  for  an  other  reason.  As  often  happens  to  be  the  case  for  "early  starters"
Hungary  may  have  effectively  exploited  a  "window  of  opportunity"  that  may  not
necessarily be replicated for countries and banks following the Hungarian experience  at a
different point in time.
With  all  these  caveats in  mind,  our  results  provide  a  consistent  and  detailed
account  of  important  features  associated  to  foreign  bank  ownership.  In  general  the
20evidence  presented  in  this  paper  seems  to  support  the  notion  that  foreign  banks
independently  from  the  nature  of the  original  investment  (greenfield  investment  or
acquisition  of control),  of management  styles  and  from  the  duration  of ownership  are
pursuing a lending policy not dissimilar from that of domestic banks, after controlling for
country  level  and  bank  level determinants  of bank  lending  decisions.  At  the same time
they  are clearly able to achieve  a consistently  higher  profitability.  This evidence  support
the notion  that foreign  banks  success  is related  to  a product  innovation,  strictly  tied to
their  ability  to  supply  a  broader  array  of  financial  services  than  their  domestic
competitors,  and to a better screening  and monitoring procedure of their loan applicants.
More  importantly,  the  ability  to  achieve  higher  profitability  levels  is  strictly
related  to the  to the duration  of their presence  in  the  country  and  to the  nature  of the
initial  investment,  with  green-field  banks  clearly  outpacing  other  foreign  banks.  In
addition  it  emerges  very  clearly  that  increased  profitability  does  not come  from  higher
intermediation  margins,  which  are  in  fact  on  average  slightly  decreasing  overtime  and
whose negative impact on profits is probably only  partly offset by increased  lending.
Finally,  while  management  style  may  not  be  clearly  related  to  overall  bank
profitability  levels, it  is clearly related  to the success of different strategies  for achieving
cost  efficiency.  On  average  for  a  given  policy  of rationalization  of the  work  force
domestic managers are considerably more effective  in reducing operating  costs than their
foreign colleagues.
The bearing of our analysis on the political  economy of foreign bank entry appear
to be the following:  the dynamic of foreign banks presence  in a country  is such that it  is
immediately  associated  to  a  reduction  of employment  and  to  higher  profits  than  local
banks..  The  two  developments  though  are  not  directly  associated,  as  foreign  banks
increase  immediately  the  level  of operating  expenses  (presumably  to  finance  their
restructuring  efforts),  offsetting the likely  gains  associated  with a reduction  of the labor
force.  More widely perceived benefits,  such as a lower cost of credit, require few years to
become  apparent.  While  no contraction  of credit  is supported  from  our  data we  do  not
have  evidence  either of an aggressive  lending  policy that may  reach  larger  layers  of the
population.  Concluding, the most evident source of profits for foreign banks derives from
21their  ability  to  access  a  richer  menu  of financial  services  and  possibly  by  their  more
higher  quality  loan portfolio.  This is  a benefit that may  not be  immediately  apparent to
the larger  public  but that  supports bank  profits immediately  from the first year  of their
establishment.  For countries, such as Hungary, where foreign banks are involved not only
in  niche  markets  but in large  commercial  banks,  the  benefits  are  likely  to be  felt by  a
large, but not necessarily new, public of customers.
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23Table  1.  Bank Loan Portfolios composition:  1993-1995
1993  1994  1995
No problem  70.7%/.  72.8%  83.4%
Special attention  6.8%  13.1%  7.3%
Substandard  2.9%  1.9%  1.7%
Doubtful  6.1%  3.2%  2.4%
Bad  13.5%  9.0%  5.2%
Total outstandings  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
Problem loans as % of total outstandings  29.3  27.2  16.6
Problem loans as % of GDP  15.4  15.1  7.3
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Table 2.  Changes in Ownership Structure of the Hungarian Banking Sector
(% of registered capital,)
Type of owner  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
1. Hungarian owners  86.7  83.5  63.9  50.5  37.2  36.4  32.4  30.8
1. State and social securities  67.7  65.8  41.8  35.6  20.3  21.1  17.1  19.3
2. Other domestic institutions  17.9  15.1  17.8  11.6  14.4  12.5  12.7  9.5
3. Private persons  1.1  2.5  4.2  3.2  2.5  2.8  2.6  2.0
II. Foreign owners  12.4  16.0  35.7  45.8  61.1  60.9  65.0  66.6
1. Credit institutions  9.9  13.9  26.8  38.9  52.8  46.5  49.9  50.8
2.  Other foreign institutions  2.6  2.2  8.8  10.1  8.6  14.4  15.1  15.8
III. Preferential  and own shares  0.9  0.5  0.4  3,7  1,6  2.7  2.6  2.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Table 3.  Number of Banks by Types  and Owners: * Selected Years  1987-2000.
1987  1990  1994  1997  2000
Commercial banks  15  28  36  33  30
From which with foreign ownership  3  14  23  28  27
-majority stake offoreigners**  2  12  19  25  26
- minority  stake offoreigners  1  2  '4  3  1
Specialized financial institutions***  6  7  6  14  12
Credit institutions total  21  35  44  47  42
From which with foreign ownership  3  14  24  34  34
- majority stake offoreigners  2  12  20  30  32
- minority stake offoreigners  1  2  4  4  2
* Without savings co-operatives  and credit co-operatives
** More than or equal to 50%
***  Specialized credit institutions,  development banks, mortgage banks and building societies
Source:  own calculation on the basis of reports of banks
24Table 4.  Share of Foreign owned Banks in the Total Assets of the Hungarian
Banking System*
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
1. Banks with majority foreign ownership  41.8  46.2  53.0  64.0  66.4  68.1
2. Banks with minority foreign ownership  37.5  36.8  40.3  25.0  24.2  22.9
Banks with foreign ownership (1+2)  79.3  83.0  93.3  89.0  90.6  91.0
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
* Without savings co-operatives, credit co-operatives  and building societies
Source: own calculations on the basis of banks'  reports
Table 5.  Number of Foreign Entries: Purchases and Green-Field  Investments
1979-1989  1990-1995  1996-2000  Total
1. Foreign entry by way of purchase  1  6  4  11
of which: with majority stake offoreigners  0  3  3  6
2. Foreign entry by way of green-field investment  4  13  8  25
of  which: with majority stake  2  9  7  18
All entries (1+2)  5  19  12  36
Coming out of the market  2  2
* Without savings co-operatives, credit co-operatives  and building societies
Source: own calculations on the basis of banks'  reports.
25Table 6.  Market Share of Commercial  Banks.
Bank Name  Foreign  Type and  % of the Total  Variation
Ownership  Year of  Assets  1993-2000
Acquisition*
2000  1993  %
National Savings Bank (OTP)  Minority  P, 1995  22.9  31.6  -8.7
HungarianForeignTradeBank(MKB)  Majority  P,  1994  9.4  9.1  0.3
CIB Bank  Majority  G,  1979  8.0  4.2  3.8
Commercial  and Creditbank (K&H)  Majority  P,  1997  7.3  8.8  -1.5
ABN Amro Bank (in 1993: MHB)  Majority  P,  1996  5.9  13.6  -7.7
Raiffeisen Bank  Majority  G,  1986  4.1  1.4  2.7
Budapest Bank  Majority  P,  1995  4.0  6.0  -2.0
Postabank and Savingsbank  Minority  P,  1990  3.9  6.4  -2.5
General Banking and Trust Co. (AEB)  Majority  P,  1990  3.9  1.0  2.9
Bank Austria Creditanstalt Hungary  Majority  G,  1990  3.8  1.0  2.8
Citibank  Majority  G,  1986  3.7  1.4  2.3
Erste Bank Hungary (in  1993:  Mez6bank)  Majority  P,  1997  2.4  1.3  1.1
Hypo-Bank Hungaria  Majority  G,  1993  2.2  - 2.2
Inter- Eur6pa Bank  Majority  P,  1989  1.8  1.5  0.3
ING Bank Hungary  Majority  G,  1991  1.7  0.8  0.9
Bank of Hungarian  Savings Cooperatives  Majority  P, 1997  1.4  1.4  0.0
Commerzbank  Budapest  Majority  G,  1993  1.7  0.4  1.3
BNP-DresdnerBank  Majority  G,  1991  1.1  0.6  0.5
Total banks more than 1% market share  89.2  90.5  -1.3
Of which:
Banks with majority foreign ownership**  62.4  52.5  9.9
Banks with minority foreign ownership**  26.8  38.0  -11.2
Banks established as greenfield  investment  26.3  9.8  16.5
Privatized banks  62.9  80.7  -17.8
* P: Acquisition,  G: Green-field  investment
**In the most years between 1993 and 2000
Source: Own calculation on the basis of reports of banks
26Table 7.  The Performance of Selected Groups of Majority Foreign-Owned  Banks
(1996-2000 Average  Values)
Groups of Banks (number of  Interest  ROA  ROE  Net Interest  Gross  Operating  Operating
banks)  Margin  Income/  Income/  Cost/  Cost/ Gross
Assets  Assets  Assets  Income
Total foreign banks (22)  5.24  1.09  12.44  3.75  6.44  3.45  53.51
Greenfield banks (12)  3.87  1.65  18.32  3.41  5.30  2.86  47.61
Of which:
Greenfield large good (4)  4.60  2.46  25.08  3.98  6.41  2.66  41.58
Greenfield niche (3)  5.00  1.64  15.47  4.12  6.40  3.23  50.40
Greenfieldweak(5)  3.54  0.49  5.03  3.16  5.00  3.32  66.31
Privatized banks (10)  6.01  0.55  6.86  3.73  6.71  3.83  57.11
Of which:
Strategic good (2)  5.12  1.85  20.13  3.25  4.99  1.66  33.35
Strategic weak (8)  6.43  -0.07  -0.95  3.96  7.54  4.88  64.70
Reference:
Domestically owned banks (4)  8.52  -0.31  -5.35  4.45  7.11  3.80  53.37
Of which:
National SavingsBank/OTP/  10.38  1.49  31.24  4.86  7.09  3.49  49.27
Table 8.  Regression Variables:  Descriptive Statistics
Variable  Mean  Standard  Minimum  Maximum
Deviation
Equity/total assets  .10  .06  -.01  0.58
Net interest income/total  .05  .03  .01  .07
assets
Operating cost/total assets  .04  .02  .01  .05
Retum on assets  .01  .04  -.36*  .08
Staff/total assets  .01  .004  .001  .03
Spreads  .05  .03  -.07  .23
Loan growth  .25  .29  -.54  .95
Foreign ownership dummy  .775  .42  0  1
(FORCONI)
*Postabank in 1998 (eliminated as an outlier).
27Table 9.  Operating Costs/Total Assets:  GLS with bank fixed  effects
Log GDP per capita (x 000)  .000548  .000508  .000472  .00058  .00068  .00056
Inflation in GDP deflator  **-.002  **-.001  **-.001  **-.001  **-.001  **-.001
Log Total Assets  ***-.02  ***-.02  ***-.02  ***-.02  ***-.02  ***-.02
Equity/TA  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01





Log years since foreign  control  -.001  -.001
Foreign CEO  **.01
Domestic CEO  .01
Foreign Board of Directors  . ___  . _..  _***.02
Constant  ***.3  ***.3  ***.3  ***.3  ***.3  ***.3
F-test  ***8.79  ***9.17  ***8.99  ***8.95  ***7.07  ***8.77
No. of observations  153  153  153  153  151  151
No. of groups  . 26  26  26  26  26  26
Hausman Chi-squared Test  ***Rejected
(Null: Random effects is appropriate)
The symbols  ***,  **, * indicate, respectively,  a significance  level smaller than 1 per cent, between  1 and 5 per
cent, and between 5 and  10 per cent.
Table  10.  Staff/Total Assets:  GLS with bank fixed effects
Coefficient
Log GDP per capita (x 000)  .0009957  .000143  .000133  .000163  .000098  .000181
Inflation in GDP deflator  .0001  .0001  .0001  .0002  .0001  .0001
Log Total Assets  ***-.003  ***-.003  ***-.003  ***-.003  ***-.003  ***.003
Net Int.  Inc. /TA  *.02  *.02  **.03  **.03  .01  **.02
Equity/TA  -.002  -.003  *-.01  -.001  -.002  -.005
FORCONI  **  003
FORCON2  ***-.003
-FORCON3  ***..002  .
FORCON4  -.001
Log years since foreign control  -.0003  *.001
Foreign CEO  ***-.004
Domestic CEO  ***-.004
Foreign Board of Directors  ***.003
Constant  ***.03  ***.03  ***.04  **.02  **.03  **.03
F-test  ***32.95  ***30.67  ***28.71  ***25.44  ***25.33  ***23.53
No. of observations  153  153  153  153  151  151
No. of groups  26  26  26  26  26  26
Hausman Chi-squared Test  ***Rejected
(Null: Random effects  is appropriate)  I
The symbols  ***,  **,  * indicate,  respectively,  a significance level smaller than I per cent, between 1 and 5 per
cent, and between 5 and  10 per cent
28Table 11.  Return on Assets:  GLS (Random Effects)
Coefficient
Log GDP per capita  .00002  .00001  .00002  .00001  .00001  .00001
Inflation in GDP deflator  **.002  **.002  ***.002  **.002  **.002  **.002
Log Total Assets  ***.007  ***.007  ***.009  ***.008  ***.007  ***.007
Equity/TA  .02  .02  .03  **.04  .03  .03





Log years since foreign control  **.006  ***.008
Foreign CEO  -.002
Domestic CEO  .002
Foreign Board of Directors  -.01
Constant  **-.2  **-.2  **-.2  **-.2  **-.2  **-.2
Wald-test (Chi-squ.)  ***32.16  ***32.55  ***44.12  ***41.99  ***36.03  ***38.29
No.  of observations  155  155  155  155  152  152
No.  of groups  26  26  26  26  26  26
Hausman  Chi-squared Test  ***Not Rejected
(Null:  Random effects is appropriate)
The symbols ***,  **,  * indicate, respectively, a significance  level smaller than  1 per cent, between  1 and 5
per cent, and between 5  and 10 per cent.
Table 12.  Spreads: GLS (Random Effects)
Coefficient
Log GDP per capita  .00001  .00001  .00001  .00002  5.06e-06  7.98e-06
Inflation in GDP deflator  .002  .002  .002  .002  .001  .001
Log Total Assets  .003  .002  .002  .001  .004  .002
Equity/TA  .02  .02  .02  .01  .01  .02
Loan growth (first difference of logs)  **-.01  **-.01  **..01  **-.01  ***-.02  **-.0l





Log years since foreign control  -.01  -.01
Foreign CEO  .02
Domestic CEO  .002
Foreign Board of Directors  -.01
Constant  -.03  -.04  -.04  -.05  -.01  -.01
Wald-test (chi-squ.)  9.81  10.62  10.75  *12.58  13.89  10.66
No. of observations  146  146  146  146  144  144
No. of groups  26  26  26  26  26  26
Hausman  Chi-squared Test  ***Not Rejected
(Null:  Random effects is appropriate)
The symbols  ***,  **, * indicate, respectively,  a significance level smaller than  1 per cent, between  1 and 5
per cent,  and between 5 and 10 per cent.
29Table  13.  Consumer Loans: GLS (Random Effects)
Coefficient
Log GDP per capita  -.00005  -5.5e-06  -.00005  -.00011  .00002  -.00005
Inflation in GDP deflator  -.002  .002  -.00004  -.004  .002  -.004
Log Total Assets  -.02  -.01  -.01  -.01  -.02  -.02
Equity/TA  **1.07  **.93  **1.00  **1.09  **.92  **1.06
Net interest income/Total  Assets  *4.15  **4.63  *4.23  *3.86  **5.93  **4.75
Operating Cost/TA  ***-6.57  ***-6.24  ***-6.17  ***-6.24  ***-8.01  ***-7.41





Log years since foreign control  .01  -.04
Foreign CEO  .10
Domestic CEO  -.07
Foreign Board of Directors
Constant  -.67  .31  .58  .97  .28  .79
Wald-test (chi-squ.)  ***32.5  ***34.32  ***34.13  ***33.13  ***38.44  ***34.87
6
No. of observations  124  124  124  124  122  122
No. of groups  26  26  26  26  26  26
Hausman  Chi-squared Test  ***Not Rejected
(Null:  Random effects is appropriate)
The symbols ***,  **,  * indicate, respectively,  a significance level smaller than 1 per cent, between 1 and 5
per cent, and between  5  and 10 per cent.
Table 14.  Type of investment:  OLS
Op. Costs/  Staff/  Return on  Spreads  Consumer
Total Assets  Total Assets  Assets  loans
Log GDP per capita  (xlOOO)  .0024  .0015  .0262  .0177  .0921
Inflation in GDP deflator  -.0003  **.0002  *.0026  .0011  .0086
Log Total Assets  **-.0026  *-.0004  .0033  .0014  -.0144
Net interest income/Total Assets  .0826  .0051  ***.6768  *3.775
Return on Assets  **377
Operating Costs/Total Assets  ***-8.973
Equity/Total Assets  ***-.0927  **.0077  *.0667  .7740  ***1.686
Foreign M&A  -.0058  ***-.0037  ***.0288  -0072  .1154
Greenfield investments  ***-.0143  ***-.0061  ***.0385  ***..0328  -.0360
Constant  .0056  .0024  -.1190  -.0434  -.1658
F-test  ***13.46  ***21.53  ***636  ***2.81  ***4.71
Adjusted R-squared  36.93%  48.98%  19.79  7.78  19.71%
No. of observations  150  153  153  151  122
The symbols ***,  *  * indicate, respectively,  a significance  level smaller than 1 per cent, between  I and 5
per cent, and between 5  and 10 per cent.
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